

TRANSLATION: a conceptual chamber opera
for flute, clarinet, violin, viola, 2 percussion,
2 soprano, mezzo soprano, tenor
By Nomi Epstein
January 2015

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Each performer is given a set of 10 text scores, one assigned to each member of the performing ensemble. One at a time, each person will perform her/his solo text score, after which the ensemble will then respond. Each performer will need a silent stopwatch (a device with a stopwatch app on it will suffice). One member of the group will cue the stopwatches to be started at the beginning of the piece.

When performing your text score, read it silently, at a comfortable, not rushed, reading pace. Choose one of two methods to interpret it.

A. Words¹

THE AND TO A AN AT I BY IT IF ON

B. Symbols²

. , () - ; “ ‘ ? : []

If you choose method A: Words, when you read the text and come to one of the words listed above, this word will act as a cue to create the corresponding sound found in your score. If you choose method B: Symbols, when you read the text and come to one of the symbols listed above, this symbol will act as a cue to create the corresponding sound found in your score. When you reach one of the word or symbol cues in your text, stop reading, perform your sound event, and then resume reading at a comfortable reading pace until the next instance of a cue word or symbol.

Performers should study these words/ symbols so that they may immediately recognize their occurrences in the text. Performers should also study their score so as to be able to easily identify which sound events match each word/symbol.

Please note that although most corresponding sounds are notated as one single sound event, there are a few which have multiple sound event options. A thick, solid bar line denotes the end of a sound event. If there are multiple sound event options, each measure prior to the last option will be marked with a double barline. In the case of multiple sound events for a word or symbol, the performer is free to choose which one of the sound events to play each time s/he comes to this word/symbol. For example in the Flute part, for the word THE and the quotation mark symbol, the player has two sound event choices, either a flutter tongue F (which is the first option and hence the measure ends with a double bar) or a flutter tongue A-flat (which is the only other choice and hence the measure ends with a thick, solid barline).

The piece will begin with one member (Performer #1) of the group moving behind the screen on stage and affixing multiple clip-on microphones to her/his clothing. The process of affixing microphones and any natural movement of the soloist while performing will produce anticipated sonic activity. Lighting will be very dim to dark on stage, though one light source will shine from behind the screen allowing a shadow of Performer #1 to be reflected through the screen. A video camera placed behind the screen captures the image of this performer, and will be projected onto a wall of the performing space.

¹ Any of the following iterations of the word “it” will also be included: it’s, its.

² ‘ This symbol represents both the apostrophe and the single quotation mark.

To make clear the list of 10 symbols, I will write out each symbol in the order notated above:

period, comma, parentheses (of either direction), dash, semi-colon, quotation marks (of either direction), single quotation/apostrophe, question mark, colon, brackets (of either direction).


Performer #1 performs her/his text score, having chosen either words or symbols as sound cues. (This, in essence, is the soloist “defining” her/himself to the group).

When Performer #1 completes her/his text piece, the remainder of the ensemble will “read” her/him. This “reading” will involve any of the following 3 methods, and each member of the group should individually choose her/his own method with each new soloist.

1. Using the shadow reflected on the screen of the shape of the soloist to dictate how to play (melodic contour/duration/color/dynamic/texture, etc. could be concluded from this image).
2. Re-performing the soloist’s text score with either words or symbols as cues.
3. Performing their own text score with either words or symbols as cues.

Towards the end of this “reading” period, the soloist will remove any microphones and return to their initial space on stage. Upon completion of Performer #1’s solo, and the response (“reading”) from the group, Performer #2 will now take on the role of soloist, moving behind the screen, affixing the microphones, and performing her/his own text piece. The remainder of the ensemble will then “read” her/him using one of the 3 methods introduced above.

This cycle will repeat for each of the performers within the ensemble, creating very different sonic landscapes for each solo and for each group translation. For this (First Take) excerpted performance, only 4 members of the group will present their solos. This will include, clarinet, soprano 1, violin, and tenor, in any order. Each solo should last approximately 2.5 minutes, and each group reading should last approximately 2.5 minutes.



To All Performers

All sound events should be between quiet to very quiet.

 a quarter tone flat.

 three quarter tones flat.

 a quarter tones sharp.

 a quarter tone sharp.

 a quarter tone flat.

 three quarter tones sharp.

Tremolos should be very fast, and one note should not be held longer than another at the start nor finish of the tremolo.

Diamond-shaped notes depict air sounds (without pitch). Though they have been written on the staff, they should be primarily pitchless, and do not refer back to where they sit on the staff.

Glissando- the beginning and ending pitches should not be held. Each glissando should involve constant and consistent pitch movement. The performer will need to carefully gauge the distance of the glissando and the duration requested so as to ensure this outcome.


Flute

Fingerings come from The Techniques of Flute Playing by Carin Levine.

Clarinet

Fingerings come from New Directions for Clarinet by Phillip Rehfeldt, heatherroche.net by Heather Roche, and clarinetinstitute.com Contemporary Technique for the Flute by Fritz Dolak.

Violin




Holding the bow at its traditional perpendicular position to the strings, center the bow on the strings and apply pressure against the strings. Then, draw the bow down the strings from the fingerboard edge toward the scroll, always keeping it perpendicular to the strings. One diagram denotes a full stroke down the length of the fingerboard (toward the scroll), one indicates a stroke just half the length of the fingerboard, while the 3rd method requires multiple short wipes down the fingerboard, each starting a little lower than the previous, until the scroll is reached.




Bow the bridge- one full bow length with medium to full pressure. A very discernable air sound is intended.

Viola



Holding the bow at its traditional perpendicular position to the strings, center the bow on the strings and apply pressure to the strings. Then, draw the bow up the strings starting near the scroll and moving toward the fingerboard's edge, always keeping it perpendicular to the strings. One diagram denotes a full stroke up the length of the fingerboard. The next diagram indicates a stroke down the fingerboard (as in the violin diagram above).



The 3rd method requires the bow be drawn half way downwards toward the scroll, and then an immediate drawing of the bow in the traditional perpendicular bowing technique on one or more strings to produce a more “pitched” sound event.



Bow the bridge- one full bow length with medium to full pressure. A very discernable air sound is intended.

Percussion 1

Instrumentation:

10-15 various sized nails/screws and large metallic nuts

2 small glass bowls

1 smooth, flat rock

1 small tile whose surface is not smooth, but, rather, has some texture to it.

Two wine glasses nearly full which are tuned $\frac{1}{4}$ tone apart from each other. Glasses should be affixed to a surface (perhaps taped to a piece of wood) so that they can be played (rub rim of glasses) simultaneously by one player.

1 piece of fine grit sandpaper cut into two equal sized sheets

1 sheet of card stock (8 $\frac{1}{2}$ x 11, or larger)

2 slide whistles (ideally children's slide whistles which come in various solid colors) of the same size.

A handful of small pieces of broken glass (smash a bottle into small pieces)

1 metal spoon

1 log drum

Bass drum mallets

Percussion 2

Instrumentation:

2 smooth, flat rocks

1 plastic bag (shopping bag size)

1 "Little Lady" Harmonica in C by Hohner

2 wine glasses, one tuned high, one low, and not matching the pitches of percussion 1's wine glasses.

Bass drum mallets

2 slide whistles (ideally children's slide whistles which come in various solid colors) of the same size.

2 small, identical plates made of porcelain or similar material.

1 wood block

1 medium hard mallet

1 bass drum

5-8 nails/screws and/or large metallic nuts

TO ALL VOCALISTS



Diamond-shaped noteheads indicate an air sound articulated with the notated vowel/consonant. Your part may include low, middle and high range air sounds referring not to dynamic level but rather to the "tone" of the air sound. These ranges are manipulated by how wide the mouth is opened during the air sound. To produce high range air sound, your mouth should almost form a smile, creating a wide oval shape.



X-shaped noteheads depict unspecified pitches. When the notehead is written in your highest range, sing the highest note you can reach, or just barely reach. When the notehead is written in your lowest range, sing the lowest note you can reach, or just barely. These extreme high/low pitches should be uncontrollable and may only speak sparsely, rather than sound as clear, controlled tones.

----- Dotted line between two performance directions indicates a gradual shift from one to the other. (see Tenor and Mezzo soprano parts).


Ah as in "all"
Eh as in "ebb"
Ee as in "seen"
Hee as in "he"
Oo as in "moon"
Oh as in "oak"
Hoo as in "hoover"
Tee as in "tea"
Ta as in "tall"
A (y) as in "say"

Soprano 1



An unstable, wide tremolo between any two pitches at least a 7th apart from one another.

Mezzo Soprano



Glissando should begin on the lowest, unstable pitch of vocal range.

Flute
non vibrato throughout

TRANSLATION

a conceptual chamber opera

Nomi Epstein
January 2015

IT
:
2"

I
?
2"

AND
-
6" airy

5"

AT
;
♩ = 86

5"

A
8"

4"

TO
[]
10"
(one breath length)

BY
()
cover embouchure hole with mouth and lightly blow through the instrument 8-10"

ON
'
rotate head joint just slightly away from mouth and lightly blow across embouchure hole. 10-15"

THE
" flutter tongue 6"

2"

IF
, 3"

7"

AN
.
♩ = 100
pp

The score consists of several staves of music. The first staff has a treble clef and a key signature of one sharp (F#). It begins with a box containing 'IT' and a colon symbol, followed by a 2-second musical phrase. The second staff starts with a box containing 'I' and a question mark, followed by another 2-second phrase. The third staff has a box with 'AND' and a hyphen, followed by a 6-second 'airy' phrase. The fourth staff contains a 5-second phrase. The fifth staff has a box with 'AT' and a semicolon, followed by a sequence of nine eighth notes, each with a fingerings diagram above it. The sixth staff has a box with '5"', followed by a 5-second phrase. The seventh staff has a box with 'A', followed by an 8-second phrase. The eighth staff has a box with '4"', followed by a 4-second phrase. The ninth staff has a box with 'TO' and '[]', followed by a 10-second phrase labeled '(one breath length)'. The tenth staff has a box with 'BY' and '()', followed by a 10-second phrase with the instruction 'cover embouchure hole with mouth and lightly blow through the instrument 8-10"'. The eleventh staff has a box with 'ON' and a single quote, followed by a 10-15 second phrase with the instruction 'rotate head joint just slightly away from mouth and lightly blow across embouchure hole. 10-15"'. The twelfth staff has a box with 'THE' and a double quote, followed by a 6-second phrase labeled 'flutter tongue'. The thirteenth staff has a box with '2"', followed by a 2-second phrase. The fourteenth staff has a box with 'IF' and a comma, followed by a 3-second phrase. The fifteenth staff has a box with '7"', followed by a 7-second phrase. The sixteenth staff has a box with 'AN' and a period, followed by a sequence of 16 eighth notes, each with a fingerings diagram above it. The tempo is marked as ♩ = 100 and the dynamics as *pp*.

Text Score #4: **FLUTE**

Self-Knowledge, Agency and Force

Lucy O'Brien

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Nov., 2005), pp. 580-601

1. Introduction

My aim in this paper is to articulate what may be called an agency theory of self-knowledge. Many theorists have stressed how important agency is to self-knowledge, and much work has been done drawing connections between the two notions. However, it has not always been clear what *epistemic* advantage agency gives us in this area and why it does so. I take it as a constraint on an adequate account of how a subject knows her own mental states and acts, that is construe the known mental states and acts realistically and as independent of their self-ascription, and that it deliver genuine epistemic standing to the knower. The main task of the paper will, then, be to explore how our having rational agency with respect to our mental states may be able to secure genuine epistemic warrant for our self-ascriptions of states or acts independent of the ascriptions. This task will be carried out by focusing on the question of what account we should give of our knowledge of what I call our acts of judging. In the remainder of this section, I will do a little to clarify what is meant by that question. Section 2 will attempt to introduce us to elements of the best way to approach the question by considering some alternative strategies. Section 3 is devoted to forming some idea of what *kind* of warrant we are looking for when considering how agency might give us self-knowledge. Section 4 aims to present a suggestion as to how agency gives us the kind of warrant identified over our acts of judging. Section 5 deals with some objections.

When we ask about our knowledge of psychological self-ascriptions of the form: Io that *P*, there are three aspects of the question that our answers can focus on, corresponding to the three components of the ascription. I can ask: (i) how do I know that Io *that P*? (ii) how do I know Io that *P*? and (iii) how do I know Io that *P*? The last question, which asks how I know that *P* is the content of my attitude, has been discussed extensively in recent years. It has, for example been asked, how, given non-individualism about content, do I know that I have an attitude with respect to water rather than water? I will for the purpose of this paper simply assume that we can explain the authority a subject has over the contents of her attitudes by using the fact that, in knowing what attitude she has, the subject is redeploying an assumed ability to think *P*. It is the first two questions, particularly the second, that will concern me: How do I know that it is me, rather than someone else, who has the attitude towards *P*, and more particularly, how do I know that Io, rather than o, that *P*? It is in attempting to answer those question that I think the agency theory of knowledge proves its worth.

I will call the relation in which a subject stands to a content 'the force' of the subject's attitude. There are of course very many relations in which a subject can stand to a content *P*. A subject can, for example, believe, think, entertain, judge, question, doubt, fear, desire, want, wish, fancy, that *P*. To consider all these different forces would involve us in more extensive a task than could reasonably be attempted here. My concern will be with only those forces we can call purely cognitive forces. I will further narrow the focus by considering those forces that characterize mental acts or events rather than states, and which we can call assertoric.

TRANSLATION

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Nomi Epstein
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I 8" *mp* n

AN 10" *mp* n

IF 3" *mp* n

BY 6" *mp* n

A 10" *mp* n

AND 8" continuously blow at/into top trill key while intermittently pressing and releasing the key

AT 7" rapid, irregular, light tonguing against reed (similar to flutter tongue) with loose embouchure

G# 6" rapid, irregular light tonguing against reed (similar to flutter tongue) with loose embouchure, sounding a quiet, unstable multiphonic

ON 8" *mp* n

IT 5" tr. tr.B

TO 10" (trem.)

Text Score #9: **CLARINET**

On the Possibility of a Solitary Language

Dorit Bar-On

Nous, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 27-45

I have already indicated how the Gricean route to language, which involves the 'reflexive' intention, may open up once we have more than one individual. But even putting aside the Gricean reflexive intention, we can appreciate that, once there are others in the picture, communicative needs of a special sort arise: an individual may have very good reasons for trying to get their attention and for structuring it. Standardized means in the form of linguistic signs (with various semantic properties) can allow individuals to do that effectively, reliably and productively. And a group of individuals attempting communication with one another can have clear advantages over a single individual trying to communicate with his or her future self. This is because of a certain asymmetry between the two- (or more) persons case and the case of one-person over time. Briefly, a person trying to communicate with someone present using signs has the luxury of seeing on the spot how her signs are taken. There can be immediate transactions between her and her audience involving the very sign she has used, so she can modify the use of the sign to suit her communicative intentions. Her audience, in turn, can adapt the way they take her sign in accordance with their perception of her intentions. Such immediate mutual adaptation seems essential to the process of stabilizing the use of linguistic signs. By its nature, Super-Crusoe's communicative set-up is radically impoverished compared to the multiple-person set-up, to the detriment of his efforts to develop linguistic norms.

Linguistic norms can in certain respects be likened-though not reducible-to (at least some) biological norms. We can perhaps compare the question whether the idea of linguistic norms of a solitary speaker makes sense to the question whether it would make sense to speak of certain biological norms applying to a *single-membered species*. I mean: a creature which is a complete freak of nature, not one whose fellows suddenly became extinct. Would there be wrong ways for it to go about its business of survival (assuming it manages to survive)? Could we say, for instance, that its digestive system, though it allows it to process food, is all wrong? Just as we may need a biological community to make sense of some biological norms, we may need a linguistic community to make sense of linguistic norms.

Violin
non vibrato throughout

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BY 15" **AN** c. 3"

" **()**

Musical notation for the words 'BY' and 'AN'. 'BY' is marked with a 15" bow length. 'AN' is marked with a c. 3" bow length. Both are shown on a treble clef staff with a single note and a bow hair icon below.

TO 5" sul tasto **A** 6" 6" 8"

: **o** **o** **o** **o**

Musical notation for the words 'TO' and 'A'. 'TO' is marked with a 5" bow length and 'sul tasto'. 'A' is marked with a 6" bow length. The notation includes notes on a treble clef staff with a bow hair icon below.

I = 86

,

Musical notation for the words 'I' and ','. 'I' is marked with a tempo of 86. The notation includes notes on a treble clef staff with a bow hair icon below.

IT = 100

;

Musical notation for the words 'IT' and ';'. 'IT' is marked with a tempo of 100. The notation includes notes on a treble clef staff with a bow hair icon below.

AND bow bridge
one full, slow bow length

?

Diagram of a violin bow with an arrow pointing to the bow bridge. Below it is a question mark in a box.

ON 1-2" 1-2" 1-2"

-

Three diagrams of a violin showing the bow length. Each is marked with '1-2"'. Below them is a minus sign in a box.

IF sul tasto 5" **THE** 4" **AT** 6"

' 8" **[]** 8" 3"

Musical notation for the words 'IF', 'THE', and 'AT'. 'IF' is marked with a 5" bow length and 'sul tasto'. 'THE' is marked with a 4" bow length. 'AT' is marked with a 6" bow length. The notation includes notes on a treble clef staff with a bow hair icon below.

Text Score #1: **VIOLIN**

Learning from Words

Jennifer Lackey

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol 73, No. 1 (Jul., 2006), pp. 77-101)

2. The Transmission of Epistemic Properties: Sufficiency

In this section, I take up the remaining thesis of TEP—the sufficiency dimension. I shall argue that speaker-warrant (justification, knowledge) is not sufficient for hearer-warrant (justification, knowledge), and hence that the picture dominating the epistemology of testimony, in which epistemic properties are *transmitted* from a speaker's belief to a hearer's, is thoroughly misguided.

Before proceeding, however, one feature of TEP-S that is important to notice is the no-defeater clause (condition 930). For, on this view, even if there are some cases in which speaker-warrant (justification, knowledge) is sufficient for hearer-warrant (justification, knowledge), the belief that a hearer acquires from a speaker does not *always* possess the relevant epistemic property to the same degree as the speaker's—a hearer may have a *defeater* for believing the proposition in question that the speaker simply does not possess. There are two different kinds of defeaters that are here relevant. First, there are what we might call *psychological defeaters*. A psychological defeater is an experience, doubt, or belief that is had by S, yet indicates that S's belief that *p* is either false or unreliably formed or sustained. Defeaters in this sense function by virtue of being *had* by S, regardless of their truth value or justificatory status. Second, there are what we might call *normative defeaters*. A normative defeater is a doubt or belief that S ought to have, yet indicates that S's belief that *p* is either false or unreliably formed or sustained. Defeaters in this sense function by virtue of being doubts or beliefs that S *should have* (whether or not S does have them) given the presence of certain available evidence.

However, even though the presence of a defeater may render a hearer's belief less warranted than the speaker's from whom it was acquired, this does not threaten the spirit of TEP-S. For what happens in such a case is that the speaker's belief that *p*, along with its warrant, *is* transmitted to the hearer, but the warrant for the hearer's belief that *p* is then defeated. What *would* contradict the spirit of TEP-S would be a case in which a hearer believes that *p* purely on the basis of a speaker's belief that *p*, possesses no defeaters for believing that *p*, and yet still has a significantly different epistemic relation to *p* than the speaker. This is precisely the sort of case I shall provide.

3. The SVT

We have seen that both theses of TEP are false and, accordingly, that each component of the BVT is false as well. We are now in a position to also see that there is a counterpart version of each component that is true—one involving the *statements* of speakers. Let us call this alternative family of theses the *Statement View of Testimony* (hereafter, the SVT).

According to the SVT, the process of communicating via testimony does not involve a speaker transmitting her belief to a hearer, along with the epistemic properties it possesses. Instead, a speaker offers a statement to a hearer, along with the epistemic properties it possesses, and a hearer forms the corresponding belief on the basis of understanding and accepting the statement in question. Statements are not, therefore, merely vehicles for expressing beliefs but, rather, they are the central bearers of epistemic significance themselves.

Viola
non vibrato throughout

TRANSLATION

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AT $\text{♩} = 144$

$\text{♩} = 96$

IT 6"

5"

3"

AN 7"

AND $\text{♩} = 120$

THE sul tasto 8"

2"

TO 8"

6"

4"

5"

BY []

bow bridge
one full, slow bow length

IF :

1-2"

1-2"

A ()

6"

I ?

sul tasto
light bow 6"

5"

3"

ON "

5"

2"

Text Score #5: **VIOLA**

On the Possibility of a Solitary Language

Dorit Bar-On

Nous, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 27-45

The point can be put by saying that linguistic community has an authority over its linguistic norms which individual within the community lack. This is not to say, for instance, that what is collectively ‘in the heads’ of the speakers of a language—in the sense of a set of associated necessary and sufficient-determines the extensions of their terms. Thus, so far as I can see, one can accept the point about community authority without doing injustice to the intuitions that have motivated the now popular Casual Theory of reference. I believe the point can also be accepted by someone who, like Tyler Burge (see 1986), wishes to reject the “conventionalist” doctrine (often attributed to Wittgenstein) that community authority yields certain truths ‘in virtue of meaning alone’, which truths an individual can only reject or doubt at the price of being charged with changing the meaning of terms, or lacking relevant concepts.

The claim about community authority as I see it pertains to truths *about* meaning, rather than to truths in virtue of meaning, and thus need not betray commitment to any objectionable doctrine of analyticity. Very briefly, the community does not, in general, have authority over whether or not any particular statement is true (e.g., that gold is a soft yellow metal, or that sofas are pieces of furniture). So, an individual may well be in a position to challenge any community-wide belief without ‘opting out’ of linguistic cooperation, *pace* conventionalism. But the community does have authority which individual speakers within it lack over what particular words and statements mean in the community’s language, as well as about phonological and syntactic norms. We can see this authority as stemming from (though not simply exhausted by) the fact that it is aspects of the whole community’s history, habits, practices, environment etc.—and not any single individual’s—which determine truths about meaning. The authority in question is directly reflected in the contrast between an individual speaker coming to think “water” means what “gold” now means and the whole community’s coming to think that. In this sense— but only in this sense— we can claim that right and wrong in the linguistic performances of individuals I, ultimately, what their linguistic community would count as right and wrong.

Percussion 1

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Nomi Epstein

THE	.	Drop nails/screws/nuts into small glass bowl one at a time in an irregular rhythm. 7" or Drop one handful for nails/screws/nuts into small bowl from a few inches above.
TO	,	Rub 1 rock against tile in a slow circular motion 8-15" or Gently drop 1 rock onto tile, holding the rock just (1/2 inch) above the tile surface. Repeat 3-4x with short but varied breaks between repetitions.
A	()	With left hand on wine glass 1, and right hand on wine glass 2, rub the rims of both glasses simultaneously to produce the requested interval of a 1/4 tone. 10-15"
AN	-	Rub two equal sized sheets of sandpaper together in slow circular motion. 4"
AT	;	Slowly crumple 1 sheet of card stock. 2"
I	“	Tune the slide whistles a 1/4 tone apart from one another, and play both at the same time with very little air pressure, creating a fragile sound that just barely speaks, or speaks with slight breaks. 5"
BY	'	With a spoon, slowly stir together a bowl of broken glass. 4"
IT	?	Log drum roll. 4"
IF	:	With one slide whistle, play a very slow glissando downwards by a minor 3 rd . 10"
ON	[]	With one slide whistle, play a very slow glissando upwards by a minor 3 rd 10"
AND		Without making any sound, or grand gesture, face your head downwards so as to look down at the ground (at feet). 7"

Text Score #2: **PERCUSSION 1**

On one of the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation

Alison Jaggar

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Dec., 1973), pp. 257-265

The thesis of translational indeterminacy is by now so well known that one hardly needs to review it. Very briefly, it is the claim that there is no one scheme of translation between natural languages which can be accepted finally as the right or correct one. One may speak of correctness in translation relative to a particular accepted scheme, but to question the correctness of a whole scheme relative to another is meaningless: "there is not even . . . an objective matter to be right or wrong about." The indeterminacy theses claims that, theoretically, any number of alternative schemes of translation may be set up, each of which is compatible with the data available and none of which we have any grounds for preferring to any other.

The claim runs strongly counter to common-sense beliefs about translation. By ordinary standards, it is simply false to claim that we can never say with finality that we have discovered the correct meaning of a foreign utterance and that, moreover, the very options of correct and incorrect translation are empty except with reference to a particular scheme of translation which itself is unsusceptible to any such judgment. I think that in this case (though not necessarily in every one) our intuitions provide a trustworthy indication that the theses of translational indeterminacy is false. However, I do not claim to have proved this in my present paper. For the moment, I shall be satisfied to show merely that *one* of Quine's two arguments will not bear any weight in supporting his theses.

Ignoring Quine's argument from the inscrutability of terms, his main argument for translational indeterminacy is based on the alleged empirical underdetermination of the analytical hypotheses which postulate equivalence in meaning between utterances in two different languages. The only "objective data" a translator has to go on in radical translation) that is, in the situation where he has to start from scratch in translating an unknown language) are "the forces that he sees impinging on the native's surfaces and the observable behavior, vocal and otherwise, of the native. But Quine believes that these data are intrinsically insufficient to verify conclusively the translator's analytical hypotheses as to the meaning of the native's utterances since they always leave open the possibility of setting up alternative systems of hypotheses which are incompatible with each other but yet which conform equally well to the translator's limited data.

This underdetermination of analytical hypotheses is not peculiar to linguistics. Quine claims that it affects all empirical hypotheses, from "highly theoretical physics" to "fairly common-sense talk of bodies." In all these cases, the empirical data available would support an indefinite number of different hypotheses. Such empirical slack is further increased by our freedom to reject certain "facts" which do not fit in with our hypotheses. Thus, in the situation of radical translation, if some of the behavior of the native speaker does not seem to square with the translator's analytical hypotheses, the latter can still preserve his hypotheses by discounting that behavior and saying that the native was lying or had made a mistake. Analogous devices for discounting data are available to the physical scientist. Thus Quine believes that the translator's analytical hypotheses resemble the hypotheses of physics in that both are empirically underdetermined in essentially similar ways by the data on the basis of which they are asserted.

Percussion 2

TRANSLATION: a conceptual chamber opera

Nomi Epstein

I ?

Rub 2 rocks against each other in a slow, circular motion. 8-15"

AN ()

Slowly handle the plastic bag so as to produce sound. 5"

THE ,

Quietly play any single pitch on the harmonica. The pitch need not be the same each time. One full breath.

A []

Rub the rim of the low tuned wine glass. 8"
or
Rub the rim of the high tuned wine glass. 5"

ON .

Bass drum roll with bass drum mallets. 10-15"

TO ‘

Tune the slide whistles a $\frac{1}{4}$ tone apart from one another, and play both at the same time with very little air pressure, creating a fragile sound that just barely speaks, or speaks with slight breaks. Make sure these are not the same pitches as Percussion 1. 8"

AT -

With one slide whistle, play a very slow glissando upwards by a minor 3rd. 8"
or
With one slide whistle, play a very slow glissando downwards by a minor 3rd. 8"

IT ;

Lightly, though not silently, place 1 plate on the other. Then remove it. Repeat this 3-4x with very short but varied breaks between.

BY “

1 quiet woodblock hit with medium hard mallet.

IF :

Drop 1 or 2 of the nails/screw/nuts at a time onto the bass drum from about half an arm length above. Pause, then repeat. Repeat this until all nuts are dropped onto the drum.

AND

Without making any sound, or grand gesture, face your head downwards so as to look down at the ground (at feet). 6"

2. How do we know the assertoric force of our attitudes?

So how is it that we know that we are judging, denying, questioning and doubting? Do we know by knowing the marks that distinguish them? What marks are those?

It is clear that attitudes with different force have different casual roles with respect to behavior. I act very differently if I judge *P* to be true than if I deny it. It is also pretty clear that the basis of my knowledge that I am judging *P*, rather than denying *P*, is not based on my observing that I am prepared to act as if *P*, rather than not. While the immediate authority we have over our mental states may at times have been exaggerated it is clear that my knowledge that I am judging that *P*, rather than denying that *P*, does not typically have to await the observation of any action on my part.

Attitudes with different forces also have different rational roles. My judgment that *P* will give rise to different future judgments and denials than my denial that *P*. It would clearly be circular to suggest that I know that I judged *P* at time *t* because of knowing that I judges *Q* at time *t*. But perhaps my knowledge that I judge, rather than deny, *P* is based on my tracking the content transitions: could I know that I judged *Q*, by tracking the transition from the contents '*P*' and '*P* implies *Q*' to '*Q*'? Again, sensitivity to content alone will not ground such knowledge. I need to know first that I hold those contents to be true.

The suggestion that we know that we believe *P* by being sensitive to its phenomenological marks has never had much appeal. The suggestion with respect to our mental act and activities has, I think more to be said in its favour. It does seem to be a feature of those mental phenomena we describe using the vocabulary of action and activity that they are phenomenologically accessible to us, that they figure in the stream of consciousness. For William James most thought is accompanied by varying degrees of striving and relief. The attempt on the part of a subject to reach an opinion is accompanied by a feeling of effort, of striving, and the resulting judgment by a sense of triumph, calm or easy relief. Perhaps this way of seeing things provides us with the marks by which we are able us to know that we are questioning rather than judging?

James distinguishes three kinds of mental activity:

- (a) Bare activity
- (b) Directed Immanent Activity
- (c) Directed activity with resistance.

Bare activity is described as having 'no definite movement, no actor and no aim. Mere restless zigzag movement'. It is hard to know what in our mental lives is characterized as 'barely active': perhaps dreaming or random thought impressions. What is clear is that it is less than idly thinking things through, for of the other two kinds of activity James says:

activity... is either aimless or directed. If directed it shows tendency. The tendency may or may not be resisted. If not we call the activity immanent, as when the body moves in empty space by its momentum or our thoughts wander at their own sweet will. If resistance is met its agent complicates the situation.

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TRANSLATION: a conceptual chamber opera

Nomi Epstein

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Soprano 1
non vibrato throughout

TRANSLATION

a conceptual chamber opera

Nomi Epstein
January 2015

6" air sound low in range

AT

hoo

6" air sound middle of vocal range

hee

5" air sound high in vocal range

hee

AN

?

mah

A

3"

shh

1"

fff

IT

6" airy

ee

5" beginning on lowest note in range

oh

2" airy

oo

8"

eh

TO

5" with closed mouth

mm

IF

9"

shh

2"

fff

I

1"

ah

BY

5" lowest pitch

oo

THE

3" highest pitch

ah

AND

5" airy

eh

ON

4" wide, unstable tremolo beginning on any pitch

ah

Translation Score #3: **SOPRANO 1**

Indeterminacy of Translation—Theory and Practice

Dorit Bar-On

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 781-810

1. The Practice of Translation-A Sketch

1.1. Translation, we may say, is the replacement of textual/discourse material of a source-language (SL) by *equivalent* material of a target-language (TL), with the consequent replacement of the SL graphology/phonology by (typically non-equivalent) TL graphology/phonology. What is the nature of the equivalence in question? Under what conditions does it obtain? While we cannot hope to provide general answer to these questions in the present discussion, we can examine the sort of considerations that often play a role in actual translational procedures.

Philosophers keen on propositions are prone to insist that, when the proposition expressed is not preserved, the result is a translation which is less than *exact*. Now, the notion of “exact translation” is an important one. Translators and critics often reject proposed translations for being “inexact.” But I think philosophers should be wary of imposing standards of exactness that are unrealistically (and needlessly) strict. I think the examples in 1.13 and 1.14, for instance illustrate cases where propositional content is sacrificed but not exactness of translation. In these cases, the propositional content is simply not relevant, given the point of each text. (The translations cited in 1.13 and 1.14 would pass what is perhaps the most stringent-and probably also unrealistic-test for exactness of translation”: we could easily get from the translation back to the original sentences by a process of backward translation.)

I am inclined to think that there is not single set of linguistic features whose preservation would always be regarded as either necessary or sufficient of exact translation in the eyes of practicing translators. It is not only the features thought to be essential-“propositional content,” “linguistic meaning,” or what have you-can sometimes be sacrificed without loss of cognitive significance. But also sometimes features which we might expect always to be able to sacrifice without loss, such as the sound of words, or gender marking, may be important enough that their preservation would be required for exact translation.

Soprano 2

non vibrato throughout

TRANSLATION
a conceptual chamber opera

Nomi Epstein
January 2015

15"
with mouth closed

AN
' mmm

2"
" ah

5"
; eh

5"
BY ? tee

1"
THE () ta

7"
A : ff

7"
TO - ss

10"
airy ah

5"
ah

8"
highest pitch
I [] eh

3"
quick tremolo beginning on any pitch interval of a perfect 4th
AND ah

♩ = 144

IF
· zz

7"
air sound low in range
AT
, whoo

5"
air sound middle of vocal range
eh

8"
air sound high in vocal range
a(y)

Text Score #10: **SOPRANO 2**

Language, Thought, and Information Processing

Patricia Smith Churchland

Nous, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May, 1980), pp. 147-170

Since the use of the expression ‘sentential’ in application to models and theories of information processing in cognitive systems is perhaps not established, it behooves me to set out as concisely as possible just what is meant. Typically, a theory of information processing which is sentential has the following features.

- (1) It takes the cognitive states to be attitudes toward sentences and hence to be identified via sentences. The identification is presumed to be possible by dint of an isomorphism holding between the states of the person (his brain, or in the case of a dualist, his soul) and the relevant sentences of a set. (There will be various theories concerning how the sentences are best analyzed.)
- (2) It takes the theoretically important relations between the cognitive states to be characterized by means of the resources of logic. The logical characterization of the relations between the states of the person (his brain, his soul) is alleged to be possible by dint of the aforementioned isomorphism. (there will be various theories of logic which will be variously favoured and invoked by cognitive psychologists and philosophers of mind.)
- (3) It takes the transition between states to be a function of the logical relations holding between the sentence identifying those states, which, in the most straightforward case will consist of inference, abductive and deductive. This characterization of the transitions is again construed as possible on the basis of an isomorphism presumed to obtain between states of the person (his brain, his soul) and sentences. (there will be various theories of logical and quasi-logical transitions variously favoured and invoked.)
- (4) It takes the evaluation of the cognitive virtue or excellence (rationality) of the system to be a function of the extent to which it succeeds in doing what the favoured theory of state transition (e.g. theory of inference) says it ideally should do.

TRANSLATION

a conceptual chamber opera

Nomi Epstein
January 2015

BY ; $\text{♩} = 60$ **IT** open mouth 8" closed mouth

he oo he oo he oo he oo ha

AND ? 3" **AT** - 5" **IF** " 2" airy

ON [] 2" **A** () **THE** .

ah oh eh sh tch c

AN ' 8"

ah

ON , airy c. 15" (breathe when necessary)
very slow gliss from lowest pitch, up an octave

eh

TO : airy c. 20" (breathe when necessary)
very slow gliss from highest pitch, down an octave

ee

Text Score #8: **MEZZO SOPRANO**

Language, Thought, and Information Processing

Patricia Smith Churchland

Nous, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May, 1980), pp. 147-170

First, evolutionary considerations should prompt us to be impressed with the continuity between hominids and non-verbal creatures, and with the fact that the human brain contains phylogenetically very old structures, such as the hypothalamus and the reticular formation, as well as more recent modifications such as the enlarged cerebral and cerebellar cortexes. It is perhaps worth dwelling on this fact when one is tempted to think of speech as the model for characterizing all cognitive activity. Suppose language is evolution's stratagem for providing for a quantum jump in the information available to certain organisms by allowing for complex information exchange between organisms. How evolution solves the problem of getting information into suitability exchangeable form may well not be the spitting image of how, with each addition in cognitive complexity, she solved the problems of processing the information. To paraphrase Hume in a different context, it may justly be inquired, "what peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the breeze which we call speech, that we must make it the model of all understanding?" The hypothesis defended by Liberman [31], which does seem plausible, is that the brain contains a coder which functions as an interface between two quite different kinds of system of representation—the evolutionarily older systems (including, e.g. long term memory) and the evolutionary *parvenu*, speech. Liberman sees the coder as essentially a device for radically restructuring information in order to get it from the linguistic mode to the non-linguistic mode (and vice versa); not, in contrast to Fodor, for getting information from one linguistic mode to another.

Secondly, as is well known, the results of research on hemisphere specialization have revealed that the left cerebral hemisphere is normally the centre of linguistic competence, while the right hemisphere is especially competent at certain apparently non-linguistic tasks, such as visuo-constructive tasks, tactile recognition and identification of objects, and recognition of human faces. Gamely groping for a theoretical vocabulary where there is none, Sperry ([42]: 12) says of the right hemisphere that it reasons by direct perceptual, synthetic, or Gestalt processing. Whatever the shortcomings of this positive characterization, the negative characterization implicit in it, the contrast to 'linguistic' processing postulated for the left hemisphere, is what I am intent on underscoring here. The evidence which leads Sperry and others to conclude that processing in the right hemisphere is normally nonlinguistic is certainly impressive, though a determined sententialist might try to save this theory by arguing that the processing in the right hemisphere is only *apparently* nonlinguistic. He might say that the right brain processes information in Mentalese, but that it is bereft of the coder with which the left brain is blessed. Thus in the event of hemisphere disconnection, as thorough commissurotomy, the right brain fails to yield an English response and cannot transmit its Mentalese encoded information to the coding-decoding location in the left brain. The best that can be said for this ploy is that it is decidedly *ad hoc*. One could as well say that the cutaneous nerve endings or the taste buds process in Mentalese, but lack an English-to-Mentalese coder, for in neither case is there the slightest evidence to support the hypothesis. The onus of proof rests on the sententialist to provide evidence for taking various neural structures to process information in accordance with his favoured model of information processing.

Tenor
non vibrato throughout

TRANSLATION

a conceptual chamber opera

Nomi Epstein
January 2015

THE
[]
8" with mouth closed
ah

2"
ah

AND
[]
(5") 1" gliss
eh

TO
[]
5"
ee

[]
[;]
7"
hee

AND
[]
7"
airy sound, with intermittent pitch
?

AN
[]
6"
eh

ON
[]
10"
[]
vuv

AT
15"
fast trem ----- slow trem
eh

IF
[]
= 144
tongue at roof of mouth
LL

A
[]
5"
with rolled tongue

BY
[]
= 144
light and airy
"

Text Score #6: **TENOR**

About Representation; or, How to Avoid Being Caught between Animal Perception and Human Language

Amy M. Schmitter

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 255-272

Many current discussions of pictorial representation seem to be caught in a dilemma: Representation is explained either through purely, indeed baldly, naturalistic accounts of perception or by reductive assimilation to current models of language. Not all contemporary discussions are so skewed, but I will argue that this dilemma informs many of the commonly available positions taken for explaining representation. And I will argue that it is a false dilemma—one that opposes rather different sorts of question, and in so doing distorts responses to those questions. The very contrast defining each horn may itself be less than fully perspicuous: On the side that allies representation with naturalistic accounts of perception, we find that claim and the ability to recognize representation is innate (or nearly so), universal, and grounded on properties of the representation that make it relevantly similar to what is represented, so that cultural conventions play no role more than skin-deep. On the side that makes representation a species of linguistic performance, we encounter the view that the representation can only be connected with what is represented by way of numerous variable and indeed arbitrary conventions, with the seeming consequence that our ability to recognize representations is learned (and learned at a rather late stage of the game) and culturally bound. Even these contrasts, however, become muddled as soon as the first side admits that on top of any natural perceptual abilities we might have, come any number of culturally inculcated beliefs and practices, indulging beliefs and practices about representation, or the second side allows that most cultures have a tendency to naturalize their conventions, which makes it extremely difficult to recover those conventions even while they operate. Most theorists of either stripe admit at least these qualifications; nonetheless, even a highly qualified adherence to the dilemma means that each side may rule out certain appeals for explaining the various features of representation, with the result that the role of perception, on the one hand, or the scope and uses to which linguistic analogies can be put on the other hand, may be misconceived.